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The rule of law and the rule of water
Nicholas Hopkins
1 Life in Egypt is dependent on water from the Nile, and historically has adjusted to the
seasonal rhythm of the river’s flow. Egyptians have created cooperative institutions to
make the best use of this water, and every so often they have passed laws spelling out the
rights and duties of those involved in water. The question this paper addresses is the
success of human efforts in Egypt to establish rules and laws to allocate the flow of water
among different users and different uses.  It  examines various attempts over the last
century or so to establish rules guiding the human use of the river’s water. 
2 Laws regulate not only the sharing among individuals and nations, but also the pricing of
water,  the efforts  to maintain its  purity and the handling of  waste water.  They also
establish the government’s role in dealing with the people and the environment. But laws
do not cover all aspects of behaviour with regard to water, and there is also a substantial
body of customary understandings. 
3 Water has its own characteristics. In particular, it must flow, and so there is a time factor.
In  nature  it  can only  flow downhill,  although pumping can reverse  that.  Water  is  a
renewable resource, and its renewability derives largely from fresh rain. It cannot be
stored long for later use without risking evaporation. The principle must be to use it or
lose it. 
 
Constraints 
4 Egypt, like all human societies, is governed or influenced by certain constraints. Some of
these are inherent in the environment, and from that point of view the importance of the
water of the Nile stands out (Butzer 1976; Ayeb 2002). Without the Nile’s water Egypt
would be a desert, because rain is an insignificant factor. The water of the Nile results
mostly from rainfall in Ethiopia, and flows down the Blue Nile to Khartoum, and thence to
Aswan  and  Egypt  (Waterbury  1979,  2002;  Said  1993).  But  this  natural  flow  has  for
centuries been manipulated in Egypt, and thus the current slogan – that Egypt is the gift
of its citizens as much as it is the gift of the Nile – makes sense. The country’s “citizens”
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organize themselves in a variety of ways to manage the water of the Nile. As Egyptian
society  has  become  more  complex,  some  of  those  forms  of  management  have  been
consolidated into rules or laws. Is Egypt then “ruled” by the water that gives it life, that
is,  by  the givens  of  its  environment,  or  by  the “laws”  or  rules  that  its  people  have
developed to articulate its society? 
5 Jacques Berque argued that the characteristics of water determined the system. On the
basis of his experience in Minufiyya (Delta) he distinguished between the discipline of the
perennial canal system and the uncertainty of the annual flood system (Berque 1957:23): 
L’irrigation pérenne, depuis la mise en service effective du Barrage, avait multiplié
les cycles agricoles, substitué au fatalisme de l’inondation annuelle le déterminisme
opiniâtre du canal, de la rigole et du billonnage.1
6 The water control  mechanisms implicit  in canals and floods reverberate through the
social system, and can lead to the passage of “laws” which then develop a dynamic of
their own. On the other hand, where there are clear rules, farmers and officials alike refer
to them as a basis and a rationalization for their actions. 
7 Given the population growth in Egypt and the rising standard of living, water is more and
more crucial to development. It is well known that Egypt is entitled to 55.5 billion cubic
metres (bcm) of water from the Nile by virtue of a bilateral agreement with the Sudan.
The current Egyptian Minister of Irrigation, Dr. Mahmoud Abou-Zeid, stated that Egypt’s
water use in 1990 was 
8 59.2 bcm (1993:  74).  Comparing that figure,  already out of  date,  with current official
population estimates for Egypt of 68 million, it is apparent that the per capita availability
of  renewable water in Egypt is  less than 1000 litres per year.2This puts Egypt in the
category of “water-scarce” countries. If Egypt is to maintain its developmental position,
let alone advance, a more efficient use of available water is necessary. Since about 85 per
cent of the water is used in agriculture, conservation must start there. 
 
Bureaucracy, law and water 
9 Egypt is thus an irrigation society.3Of the water that comes into the country about 84 per
cent is used for agriculture (Abou-Zeid 1993: 74). The present irrigation system reflects
the last stages of a complex history. In particular, it represents the reconstruction of the
Egyptian irrigation system by Egyptian and European engineers in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The history of Egyptian irrigation is one of human efforts to control
the flood for the benefit of agriculture. Over the centuries a system of dykes and canals
grew up, which trapped the annual flood waters in basins and ensured that water covered
the  maximum area.  This  system was partly  managed locally  and partly  through the
efforts of the central government. It waxed and waned with the authority of the central
government  (Alleaume  1992,  Maury  1987,  Borsch  2000).  Beginning  in  the  time  of
Mohamed Ali in the early nineteenth century, a long process of centralization took place.
This process continues to the present day, where it is symbolized by the Aswan High Dam,
which in 1964 first blocked the flood and fundamentally changed the lives of the farmers. 
10 An engineering success requires an administrative and legal counterpart. At the end of
the nineteenth century, European observers reflected on the rulelessness of the system,
and felt that this “chaos” favored the rich: 
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The rich and the powerful are so interested in the present chaos being conserved,
that they strongly oppose any change (Willcocks 1889: 288). 
11 In  the same vein,  Barois,  the  French counterpart  of  Willcocks,  noted (1887:  123-124;
English translation 1889): 
Thus we find in Egypt neither a special set of rules covering water use, nor any
particular court for irrigation affairs,  nor suitable penalties for irrigation faults.
This  is  surprising  and  one  should  take  note  …  The  farmer  enjoys  the  greatest
freedom to open irrigation ditches or to create off-takes in canal banks and to use
and abuse the water that flows by his land.  There is  no model to govern water
extraction. There is no relationship between the area under cultivation and the size
of  irrigation  head-works.  Under  these  conditions,  the  big  landowners  have
obviously  a  lot  of  opportunities  to  seize  the  water  for  their  benefit  and to  the
detriment of the small farmers. 
12 However, comparative study suggests that this chaotic absence of rules was more in the
eye of  the beholder than on the ground (Maass and Anderson 1978),  and thus these
comments must be approached with scepticism. 
13 In the 1880s, the English took over the management of the Egyptian irrigation system and
found it deficient in various ways (Hopkins 1991). One of the engineers brought from
India noted: “There can be no manner of doubt that, up to 1882, Egyptian irrigation was
going down-hill” (Ross 1889: vi). The head engineer commented (Scott-Moncrieff, quoted
in Sandes 1937: 371): “Happy is the reformer who finds things so bad that he cannot make
a movement without making an improvement.” Word play aside, from an engineering
point of view the English worked to improve the network of canals, dykes and barrages.
From a social  point  of  view they strengthened the Irrigation Service and established
procedures to govern irrigation (in the decrees of 1890 and 1894). By 1902, the French
geographer Brunhes could note, with some envy, that the English had fully established
their authority over the irrigation system through the creation of the Irrigation Service,
with its rules, its omnipresent personnel and its concern for the economic dimension
(1902: 388, 408): 
L’eau du Nil  a  créé  l’Égypte  et  la  recrée  tous  les  ans;  le  Service  de  l’Irrigation,
discret,  silencieux,  mais  très  agissant  et  partout  présent,  en  surveillant  la
distribution de l’eau du Nil, est aussi en train de recréer l’Égypte, ou mieux de créer
une Égypte nouvelle.4
14 The creation of an Irrigation Service – a bureaucracy – was thus as important as the
physical engineering of water flow. 
15 This concern with the bureaucracy and management of the irrigation system persists. It
would seem that as the system became established and routinized, the penetration of the
bureaucracy into the countryside was reduced. In recent years, unlike the Ministry of
Agriculture, whose personnel were present in every cooperative and therefore essentially
in  every  village,  the  personnel  of  the  Ministry  of  Irrigation (known officially  as  the
Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources, or MPWWR) were only present at middle
and higher  levels.  The government’s  efforts  have been focused on manipulating and
controlling the overall structure of the system, while farmers of all types have been left
alone to organize themselves with regard to the Ministry of Irrigation’s supply of water.
This has produced a double system of management. By and large it would be fair to say
that  neither  side  knows  much  about  the  other.  The  official  system  of  irrigation  is
governed  by  laws  and  decrees  emanating  from  the  national  government,  while  the
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various local systems have been governed by patterns of local custom and rights of use.
They mesh without integrating. 
16 In the 1970s and 1980s various foreign donors, but notably USAID, began to debate ways
of  improving  the  performance  of  the  Egyptian  irrigation  system.  The  goals  were  to
produce more food (a higher yield) combined with saving water (anticipating a water
shortage) and higher net income for farmers (Abdelaziz 1995). The overall goal was “the
effective control of Nile waters for their optimal allocation to and within agriculture as a
means of helping increase agricultural production and productivity” (USAID 1989). The
means of achieving this was to modify the technical attributes of local irrigation systems
and  to  combine  this  with  farmer  involvement  through water  user  associations.  The
system would be based on “continuous flow”, i.e. the farmer has access to water at any
time, rather than approximately every other week as at present. From a social point of
view, the approach was to encourage participation by local individuals and communities
in the management of irrigation. This point is returned to below after an examination of
other legal aspects. 
 
Irrigation laws 
17 The relevant legislation includes a set of laws enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, laying down
the legal framework for the activities of the MPWWR, the issue of putting a price on
water, and the maintenance of water purity by legislating against dumping. 
18 It was also during this period – in 1992 – that the “owners and tenants law”, repealing
certain aspects of the 1952 land reform, was passed (Hopkins 1995;  Saad 1999,  2002).
Although  both  laws  are  part  of  the  “modernization”  of  Egypt,  there  is  no  intrinsic
connection between them, since the irrigation law focuses on the role of the state and the
land law on relations between individuals. The 1994 amendment to the irrigation law
reflected international development pressure to bring about institutional changes in the
organization of irrigation. However, none of the versions of the irrigation law attempted
to regulate customary patterns of cooperation among neighboring farmers. 
19 Law  No.  12  of  1984,  replacing  earlier  laws  such  as  that  of  1971,  sets  out  the  basic
framework for irrigation and drainage. It defines the areas in which the officials of the
MPWWR can operate, and outlines the responsibilities of the users or owners. According
to  this  law,  the  MPWWR controls  the  land  needed  for  irrigation,  including  any
construction or modification of it. The ministry is also responsible for determining the
flow of water and the pattern of rotation among canals. It may interrupt the flow of water
at any point or time. No one may dig a well,  install  a pump or waterwheel (saqiyya),
without permission. No one may plant rice without permission (this is the only crop the
law regulates).  The ministry should ensure fair distribution of water. In case of flood
danger, the ministry may mobilize anyone or anything, and do whatever is required to
prevent a breach of canal banks. Any complaints about official decisions can be appealed
to a higher level in the ministry. Irrigation engineers may be deputized by the Ministry of
Justice  to  arrest  or  otherwise  constrain  people  for  crimes  related  to  these  laws.
Miscreants can be fined in accordance with amounts specified in the law. 
20 Owners  may take water  in  proportion to  their  landholdings  along a  canal.  Although
landowners are entitled to a share of water, they do not own the water itself, and thus
there is no basis for a water market. Users are responsible for maintenance of “private”
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canals,  often known as misqâs in the literature,  and drainage canals.  The ministry is
responsible  for  the  tile  drainage  system.  Village  officials  are  also  given  some
responsibility for supervision and maintenance. 
 
Creation of irrigation communities 
21 As various foreign donors began to work with the Egyptian government to improve the
Egyptian irrigation system, Law No. 213 of 1994 was passed to amend the 1984 law. The
government then issued Decree No. 14900 of 1995. This decree, in Articles 43–54, concerns
the  implementation  of  some  provisions  relating  to  irrigation  and  drainage  law,  and
includes the text that authorizes the creation of water user associations along improved
or developed canals in old lands. A slightly different text applies to new lands. 
22 According to this text: “All farmers using the developed irrigation canal shall form an
association  or  operate  and  maintain  water  pumps  and irrigation  canals  and  private
irrigation equipment, and shall determine the costs of irrigation and collect them from
the farmers.” The MPWWR, through the general director of development, shall determine
when a developed system exists, and where. The provisions in this law therefore apply
only to such areas. 
23 In establishing a water user association, the engineer meets with the farmers to inform
them about the decree and to explain the details.  At the first meeting,  called by the
engineer, the farmers elect their officials. The head is called a “shaykh”; there can also be
a treasurer and a secretary, as well as a system operator. 
24 The assembly of the association chooses a title, and applies to have it registered. The
association’s officials work with the ministry to develop the canal. When it is ready it is
handed over to the association, which is then responsible for operation and maintenance,
and for the financial accounting. The association has a bank account, and it sets the fees,
collects the money, deposits it and decides on expenditures. The association chooses an
operator,  fixes  a  timetable,  monitors  crop  choice,  ensures  water  delivery,  spreads
technical information, encourages environmental awareness and settles any disputes. 
25 This process was elaborated further by the Irrigation Advisory Service set up within the
MPWWR to encourage and oversee this process (Abdelaziz 1995: 430-1; see also Hvidt
1998). Eleven prototype sites were established across Egypt – five in the Delta and six
south  of  Cairo  in  Upper  Egypt  (Abdelaziz  1995:  428).  The  process  was  described  by
Abdelaziz (1995: 431), a ministry official: 
The phases are entry, initial organization, preparation for planning and design of
misqâs, participation in the improved mesqa implementation process and turnover,
regular operations and maintenance and federation on the branch canals … ”These
processes have” been revised each year as lessons learned are fed back … The focus
is on finding ways in which water users are involved in each of the seven phases of
the process. 
26 Abdelaziz also noted (1995:  431),  referring to traditional  irrigation communities,  that
“Many of these informal principles have been built into the existing formal water user
associations.” He does not identify these informal principles that have been incorporated,
and the texts on the associations are not very specific. If it is only a matter of using the
term “shaykh” for the head of an association, that clearly does not go very far. The very
formality of the new associations, with names and a legal status, bank accounts, elected
officers, swears with the informality of the less bureaucratized emergent organizations. 
The rule of law and the rule of water
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
5
 The cost of water 
27 Establishing a  cost  for  water  has  also been the subject  of  legislation and regulation.
During the colonial period, it was assumed that the price of providing irrigation water
was covered by the land tax. This is indirectly confirmed by linking the right to water to
land  ownership,  as  in  the  1984  law.  Thus  it  was  the  task  of  government  to  ensure
agricultural prosperity by providing water and other measures, and this prosperity would
result in higher tax revenues. In the current situation, the land tax is applied only to
those  owning  more  than  five  feddans  (Said  1993:  275),  and  even  then  somewhat
erratically. (Land records have not yet stabilized since the change in the agrarian regime
in 1992/97.) This relatively high threshold means that much land is untaxed. Mohieddin
(1995) concluded that the tax agents who collected the land tax were overwhelmed, and
could not be counted on to collect a water tax as well. 
28 The thinking of various officials, especially among foreign donors, has shifted to a direct
water fee, or to be more precise, a user fee for use of the amenities of the irrigation
system. This is sometimes justified in terms of “cost recovery” for the government, which
pays to build and maintain the system. Thus, in the new water user associations which
handle improved canals,  the users5are supposed to pay a fee that would produce the
revenue  needed  to  run  the  pump  and  provide  other  maintenance.  However,  these
associations are probably too new for us to judge them in this respect. 
29 On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  continuing  debate  about  whether  farmers  should  be
required to “pay” for their water. Two arguments against this are heard. Some argue that
under Islamic law, water should be free for the taking. If water is linked to the land, then
perhaps it is a right inherent in ownership. The counter-argument is the one alluded to
above, that people are paying for the service of providing the water rather than for the
water itself. Others argue that economic conditions for small (and poor) farmers are such
that they should be subsidized by not having to pay for their water. 
30 This is especially significant at a time when the agrarian counter-reform has driven up
the cost of renting land. One is inclined to suspect that this concern for small farmers
amounts to crocodile tears. It was certainly not evident when the Egyptian parliament
passed the agrarian counter-reform law in 1992. This law was surely intended to make it
easier for land to pass from the hands of small farmers to those of large farmers, and thus
to push small and marginal farmers off the land. One may ask why a concern for the well 
being of small farmers was not also evident then. The answer could be that if the “owners
and tenants” law of 1992 was indeed intended to benefit the wealthier, so is the refusal to
countenance payment for water. In this, the interests of large and small farmers are not
opposed but identical. Large farmers who argue that small farmers cannot afford to pay
for water, are thus really protecting themselves from having to pay. 
31 There is  another  argument  about  the need to  pay for water.  It  asserts  that  farmers
naturally tend to over-irrigate and therefore to waste water, and that the only way to
control  this  is  to  impose  on  them  a  sufficient  cost  for  water,  so  that  they  learn
conservation the hard way – through their wallet. This argument has several flaws. On
the one hand, most of the evidence is that farmers do not over-irrigate: for many plants,
too much water is as harmful as too little. When they do irrigate in ways that might be
excessive, this is usually to cope with the uncertainties of water delivery by the ministry
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in the canals. Thus it is not a demand problem, but a supply one.6On the other hand,
farmers almost always face a cost for water, because almost everywhere it has to be lifted
from the canal to the level of the fields. Farmers have to maintain the animal that turns
the saqiyya, or the motor that runs the pumps, or they have to pay another farmer for
access to his water-lifting equipment. Thus if a cost for water alone was needed to ensure
conservation, then such a system already exists. 
 
Water purity 
32 Water flows through Egypt typically in open canals, with a parallel set of drains for used
water.  Dumping  waste  in  a  convenient  canal  that  can  carry  it  away  is  a  constant
temptation. Some feel that flowing water purifies itself (which it might, but not within
the distances involved). Excessive dumping diminishes the water quality and harms the
downstream users. Since polluted water is used for irrigation and contaminates plants,
the damage can be more extensive. Research carried out in Minufiyya in the mid-1990s
shows that  all  the water sources available to villagers  are polluted – the canals,  the
shallow wells and the artesian wells, although for different reasons (Hopkins et al. 2001:
42-43). 
33 The Egyptian parliament has passed laws forbidding such dumping and imposing fines.
Most people are aware of these laws, for instance, Law No. 48 of 1982. In our sample in the
late 1990s, 71 per cent admitted to knowledge of this law. They understood that such
dumping is the major cause for poor water quality. Nevertheless, they continue dumping
(and tolerating other forms of pollution, such as agricultural run-off), in part because
alternatives are not available. Dumping can entail a fine of LE1000, but the law is not
enforced. We have no record of people chiding their upstream neighbors for fouling the
canals (Hopkins et al. 2001: 100-104). Mehanna et al. (1984: 57) report that the fouling of
the  canals  adds  a  cost  for  farmers,  as  they  must  hire  machinery  to  clean  out  the
hazardous metal and broken glass in the canal bed – all illegally dumped. 
 
Irrigation communities 
34 Despite the references in ministry literature to the study by Mehanna et al. (1984), there is
no  indication  that  government  officials  took  much  account  of  local  irrigation
communities and the various forms of customary law and practice that regulate them.
They are perhaps guilty of what one can call the “fallacy of the empty box” – the notion
that there is nothing there (i.e. in rural society) except what the authorities put there.
Since the box is empty, there is no prior organization to take into account. One can build
from  scratch.  Ignorance  of  local  organization  is  confused  with  the  absence  of  such
organization. But the box was not really empty. 
35 Although there is one law for managing irrigation systems in Egypt, there is considerable
variation in the local organization of irrigation (Mehanna et al. 1984). The critical fact in
this  local  social  organization of  irrigation is  that  the  water  must  be  lifted from the
government  canal  or  from  the  mesqa  to  the  network  of  field  ditches  that  actually
transports the water to the fields and crops. The lifting distance is typically from 50 cm to
one metre. The cooperation required to manage the lifting point and the field ditches
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becomes  the  focus  of  the  local  social  organization.7The  group  of  people  who  work
together can be labeled the “irrigation community”. 
36 In much of the Delta, for instance, there are groups of farmers who share the use of a
saqiyya or a pump on a more or less equal basis (known in the literature as a “saqiyya 
ring”, see Mehanna et al. 1984: 42-46; Radwan 1997, 1998). In large parts of Upper Egypt,
especially between Asyut and Suhag, the irrigation system is built around large pumps
that are typically (but not invariably) owned by the larger farmers, who charge other
farmers for the service of lifting the water (Hopkins 1987: 98–105). In the Fayoum, where
the steeper  slope allows  gravity  flow,  groups  of  farmers  manage the  division of  the
flowing water by turns among themselves (Mehanna et al., 1984: 92–133). In certain areas
of Middle Egypt (Minya), gravity flow irrigation is possible (ibid.: 66–91). In the new lands
of Tahrir, west of the Delta, the government pumps the water up a considerable height
before farmers take over the management of the final lift (Hopkins 1999). 
37 The basis for most rural social organization in Egypt is the village. The village, however,
plays a relatively small role in irrigation per se. Most of the irrigation communities are
much smaller than a village, and there is no coordination between them. In so far as there
is organization at higher levels, it follows the canal structure, not the village boundaries,
and the two are not connected. However, the conventional dispute resolution
mechanisms found in the village, which reflect village social organization, can be brought
to bear on irrigation disputes. These typically involve negotiation and mediation, led by
senior  men,  rather  than the  application of  rules,  although they  are  built  on  shared
understandings (Nielsen 1998). 
38 One should also keep in mind that most of the informal and “traditional” water user
associations  incorporate  individual  distinctions  and  status  differentiation,  based  on
wealth, power, age, and so on, that are highly relevant for rural Egypt. The assumption in
the literature on the new associations is that there are just undifferentiated “farmers”;
nothing could be less helpful (see Radwan 1998). 
39 Hunt  and  Hunt  (1976)  have  identified  the  main  tasks  for  an  irrigation  system  as
maintenance, allocation of water and conflict settlement, in addition to construction. The
design of the new system in Egypt seems to take account of these tasks better than some
others, where the focus is almost entirely on maintenance. However, it remains to be seen
whether the bureaucracy will really relinquish its control over water, and whether the
new (and still largely untried) system can indeed draw on the “social capital” implicit in
the existing irrigation communities. 8
 
Problems and solutions 
40 Water is scarce at the national level, and planners are apprehensive. But it is not scarce at
the local level, and indeed appears plentiful. The main anxiety of farmers has to do not
with the amount of water they think is available, but with factors in the ministry that
impede water  from entering their  misqâs  and canals.  For instance,  the ministry may
divert water from one canal to another, thus causing a shortfall in the first canal, or there
may be unannounced maintenance or construction problems. The ministry may either
oversupply or undersupply a particular canal without much warning. Sometimes deferred
maintenance or similar problems may reduce the flow of water. 
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41 Farmers are also resourceful in dealing with these problems. A common solution is to
establish an illegal connection between two canals by transferring water from one to
another by pumping or by flow (see case in Mehanna et al. 1984: 85-86). Tampering with
the irrigation works to increase flow is also known. Unlike taking extra water, this can
lead to a charge of destroying public property, a more serious matter (Mehanna et al.
1984: 132). In some cases, farmers along a canal join together to send a complaint to the
local ministry officials, or even to the provincial governor (Mehanna et al. 1984: 125) or to
the ministry in Cairo (Radwan 1997: 87-88). This sometimes has the desired effect. 
42 Also, most of the irrigation problems reported by farmers do not deal with competition
for water, but with labour, maintenance and other problems. For instance, in the Delta,
when much water lifting was done by animal-powered saqiyyas, which are relatively slow,
farmers became impatient for their turns and arguments could erupt. A more widespread
use of the faster pumps has reduced this. There can be problems between farmers with
adjacent fields when one farmer over-irrigates and the water spills over into the field of
another. Farmers in a single irrigation community can quarrel over responsibility for
maintenance, but the shared understanding of what those responsibilities are, and the
knowledge of what the solutions are, limits such disputes. Generally, water quarrels are
much more circumscribed and less emotional than those over land. They are generally
not over water itself.  The ability of some to prevent others from the use of water is
limited by the nature of flowing water. Mehanna et al. note (1984: 20) that some of the
annoyance that irrigators may feel with each other is deflected to the outside enemy, the
ministry. 
43 The  most  serious  quarrels  reported  are in  the  Fayoum,  where  actual  water  theft  is
possible. The gravity system there involves time shares and long ditches, and occasionally
a farmer who is upstream of the actual user diverts someone else’s water to his own use
while the legitimate user is busy in his field. Usually the aggrieved party seeks out the
designated head of the irrigation system, who identifies the problem and fines the culprit.
Once, in an extreme case where one might suspect other factors, such a dispute is said to
have led to murder (Mehanna et al. 1984: 133). 
 
Concluding comments 
44 The flow of water in the Nile, and especially its annual flood, is a natural event. This event
was controlled first of all  by engineering to regularize the annual flow of water,  and
secondly by government laws and local practices, created by the Egyptians to systematize
the expectations that people may have of each other with reference to water. 
45 In Egypt,  various laws pertaining to water are passed by parliament.  Many lay down
guidelines  for  general  administration.  Others  attempt  to  prohibit  such  behaviour  as
dumping, or changes in the engineering structures of irrigation, but are only as good as
their enforcement. Laws setting up a framework for behaviour, such as for the water user
associations, effectively represent a top-down approach, because the initiative rests with
the  ministry.  It  is  too  early  to  say  whether  they  will  be  effective  in  creating  new
institutions. 
46 In the meantime, many long-established social institutions function effectively. In the
Delta, there are hundreds of thousands of shared lifting points. In some cases the lifting
point is organized in a “saqiyya ring”; in other cases a mobile pump is brought in by each
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user, but the users must still share a network of field ditches. Whether it uses animal
power  or  a  machine,  all  of  the  lifting  points  operate  on  essentially  the  same social
principles,  which are felt with the force of law. This is true even though there is no
mechanism to ensure it. The members of the ring understand the rights and obligations
involved, and they generally work smoothly. The same could be said for the privately
owned  pumps  in  the  Asyut-Sohag  area,  for  the  gravity  flow  systems  in  Minya  and
Fayoum,  and  certainly  for  other  systems  that  remain  to  be  analysed.  These  reflect
customary practice rather than law.  They are more a response to the ecological  and
environmental constraints imposed by water, than a reflection of managerial philosophy. 
47 The nature of water creates constraints on how it can be managed. Unlike land, it moves
through space and time. It can also deteriorate through pollution, or be “wasted”. It must
be managed both at the level of the river basin, and at the level of the individual farm or
canal. The social framework for managing water is Egypt is provided first of all by the
laws that govern the state, and secondly by the practices of millions of farmers. How
farmers manage is affected first of all by the rule of water, and second by the rule of law. 
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NOTES
1. “Perennial  irrigation … has … substituted the stubborn determinism of  the canals  for  the
fatalism of the annual flood.” 
2. One  source  gives  the  figure  of  the  availability  of  936  cubic  metres  per  capita  renewable
freshwater per year in 1995. The per capita amount can only decline if population increases while
the water supply remains stable. 
3. Some, such as Karl Wittfogel, have called it a “hydraulic society”: “The hydraulic state is a
genuinely managerial state. This has far-reaching societal implications. As manager of hydraulic
and other mammoth constructions, the hydraulic state prevents the nongovernmental forces of
society from crystallizing into independent bodies strong enough to counterbalance and control
the political machine.” (1957: 49). However, Wittfogel did not adequately take into account the
patterns of local control of irrigation, which are strong in both premodern and modern Egypt. 
4. “The water of the Nile created Egypt and creates it anew every year; the Irrigation Service,
discrete, silent, but very active and present everywhere, by supervising the distribution of the
Nile water, is also recreating Egypt, or rather, it is creating a new Egypt.” 
5. There was no discussion of how to handle the situation where the user is not the owner. 
6. Radwan (1998) also argues that the Ministry of Irrigation oversupplies the canals with water by
at least 50 per cent. 
7. The “below grade system” which dominates in Egypt today was instituted at the beginning of
the 1950s precisely to create a cost for water and thus encourage more cautious use (Mehanna,
Huntington, and Antonius 1984: 18, 69). 
8. Social capital here can be understood as the knowledge of ways to organize to achieve goals. 
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Mots-clés : droit de l’eau, eau, irrigation
The rule of law and the rule of water
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
12
AUTEUR
NICHOLAS HOPKINS
American University in Cairo
The rule of law and the rule of water
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
13
